Marquette Law Review
Volume 62
Issue 3 Spring 1979

Article 3

Excess Liability Insurance
Patrick R. Griffin

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Patrick R. Griffin, Excess Liability Insurance, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 375 (1979).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol62/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

EXCESS LIABILITY INSURANCE
PATRICK R. GRIFFIN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written in recent times about an insurer's
exposure to excess liability resulting from its misconduct in the
handling and settlement of claims.' The law has now sufficiently developed that it can be stated with reasonable certainty that an insurer is subject to liability if it wrongfully
refuses to defend or settle a claim made by a third party against
the insured.2 However, when the insured also carries additional
liability policies which provide protection in excess of the primary insurer's policy limits, the results are somewhat unclear.
Where there is excess insurance coverage, if the primary
carrier wrongfully refuses to defend or compromise a claim
which results in a judgment against the insured in excess of
the primary policy limits, primary responsibility for payment
of the excess amount does not fall directly on the shoulders of
the insured. Rather, the excess carrier, by virtue of its contract
with the insured, is obligated to pay the excess judgment falling within its limits. In this article, the relationship between
primary and excess insurance carriers will be examined. An
attempt will be made to delineate the respective rights and
obligations the insurers have to one another and to identify
those situations where a primary carrier may be liable to an
excess insurer for its misconduct in the handling of a claim.
* B.B.A. 1975, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1978, Marquette University; associate with the law firm of Bunk & Conter, S.C., West Bend, Wisconsin; member,
Wisconsin Bar Association.
1. See, e.g., P. MAGARICK, EXCESs LIABILITY (1976) [hereinafter cited as
MAGARICK]; Cochran, The Obligation to Settle Within Policy Limits, 1970 INs. L. J.

583 (1970); Kircher, Insurer's Mistaken Judgment - A New Tort?, 59 MARQ. L. REv.
775 (1976); Lipsig, Limitless Horizons of Limited Policiesof Insurance, 20 CLEV. ST.

L. REv. 1 (1971); Comment, Excess Liability Suits - The Mounting Need for Strict
Liability, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 292 (1968).
2. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d
495 (1974); Alt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340, 237 N.W.2d 706
(1976).
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THE AMORPHOUS LEGAL PERCEPTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN PRIMARY AND EXCESS INSURERS

To date, the relationship between primary and excess insurance carriers has not been authoritatively identified. This may
be due, in part, to the fact that until recently there has been a
dearth of case law on the subject.3 This noted absence of case
law can be explained by the fact that until recently jury awards
did not exceed the limits of most primary insurance policies.'
In those cases where an excess carrier's policy was involved as
a result of misconduct on the part of the primary insurer, the
subsequent disputes between the two carriers seldom went
through the judicial system, the matters frequently being resolved through arbitration. 5 Another explanation for the paucity of law on the subject has been that excess insurers rarely
attempted to enforce their rights against primary carriers.'
While there have been a number of recent attempts to legislatively 7 or administratively regulate the claims settlement
practices of insurers, the regulations have not been altogether
satisfactory. Specifically, they fail to address the relationship
between primary and excess carriers.9 There is, however, a developing body of case law on the subject, stimulated by excess
insurers' attempts to recover losses occasioned by escalating
verdicts.
In a number of cases, excess insurance carriers have been
3. See, Bloom, Recovery Against PrimaryInsurer by Excess Carrierfor Bad Faith
or Negligent Failure to Settle, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 235 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Bloom]. See also Hardies, Guiding Principles (and Principals) in Primary and Excess
Problems, 1977 INS. L.J. 469.
4. Bloom, supra note 3, at 237; Lanzone, PrimaryInsurer'sDuty to Excess Insurer,
in Insurance Law-Excess Liability 18 (Def. Research Inst. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Lanzone].
5. See MAGARICK, supra note 1, at 216-18. There, the author notes that the Claims
Executive Council of the American Insurance Association and the American Mutual
Insurance Alliance, together with some unaffiliated insurers, in 1974 proposed to their
member companies the adoption of some guiding principles for the handling of liability
claims where both a primary and an excess insurer are involved. The recommendations
urge that any differences between the primary and excess carriers be resolved by
arbitration.
6. Bloom, supra note 3, at 238.
7. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 746.230 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Wis. AD. CODE § Ins. 6.11 (1978).
9. Both the Oregon statute and the Wisconsin regulations, as well as those of most
other jurisdictions, are based on the Model Unfair Claims Practices Settlement Act.
See Houser, First-Party Claims for More Than Policy Limits-A Defendant's
Viewpoint, 11 FORUM 529, 534-35 (1976).
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allowed to recover their losses from primary insurers who were
guilty of negligence or bad faith in the handling of a claim
against an insured. Though several different theories of recovery have been recognized, the essence of the primary insurer's
liability has not been well stated. Despite these variations
there are a number of general principles which the courts consistently follow.
A primary insurer is solely responsible for claims made
against an insured for amounts within the primary policy limits.I° The primary carrier must exhaust the full limits of its
coverage before an excess insurer can be required to contribute
toward a compromise settlement or judgment." If the primary
insurer violates any of its general duties of good faith and ordinary care in the handling of claims against the insured, its
liability to the excess carrier will be for the loss caused by its
misconduct which would have fallen on the shoulders of the
insured absent the excess coverage.2
When an excess carrier sues a primary insurer for the mishandling of a claim, it appears that the excess carrier may sue
either in tort or for breach of contract. If the excess carrier sues
in tort, it may recover either in its own capacity as a foreseeable
injured party 3 or by asserting the rights of the insured through
the doctrine of equitable subrogation. 4 If the suit is for breach
of contract, the excess carrier can only assert the insured's
rights acquired through subrogation. In such situations the
lack of privity between the two insurers and the lack of third
party beneficiary principles prohibit the excess carrier from
bringing an action in its own name against the primary carrier.'-'
While there is no direct contractual liability to the excess
10. MAGARICK, supra note 1, at 215.
11. Id.; Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977); St. Paul-Mercury
Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951); Vencill v. Continental Cas. Co.,
433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. W. Va. 1977).
12. See generally Bloom, supra note 3, at 238; Knepper, Relationships Between
Primary and Excess Carriers in Cases Where Judgment or Settlement Value Will
Exhaust the Primary Coverage, 20 INs. CouNsEL J. 207 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
Knepper].
13. Holloway & Hamm, Defenses to Excess Carrier'sSuit Against a PrimaryCarrier-Refusal to Defend or Settle, 11 FORUM 940, 941 (1976) [hereinafter cited as

Holloway].
14. See generally Bloom, supra note 3, at 236-37.
15. See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 120 Ariz.
518, 433 P.2d 966 (1967); Holloway, supra note 13, at 941-42.
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insurer, several courts have either implicitly or explicity recognized the existence of a direct duty of conduct owed to excess
insurers by primary carriers. 6 Other courts have held that no
such direct duty exists and concomitantly, that an excess carrier has no direct right of action against a primary carrier who
fails to handle claims in good faith. 7
The basis of the primary insurer's direct duty has never
been clearly explained. By recognizing this duty, courts have
accomplished openly what the subrogation doctrine only allowed indirectly and eliminated many of the problems encountered in the application of the principles of subrogation.18 However, by allowing recovery on the basis of a direct duty, courts
have ventured into a new area, without the benefit of the traditional rules and defenses of subrogation. For example, if both
the primary and excess insurers are guilty of some culpable
conduct, with the primary's fault being greater, a question arises whether the excess carrier should be allowed to recover.
While the law of subrogation recognizes equitable defenses,
the law governing direct liability of primary insurers has not
sufficiently developed to provide an answer to the problem.
The decisions which have held primary carriers liable for a
breach of this direct duty have not adequately explained the
basis of the duty or of the primary insurer's liability. The typical opinion merely recites the existence of the duty and proceeds to find the insurer liable for failing to conform to the
standard of conduct required under the circumstances.
Perhaps the basis of a primary insurer's direct liability
16. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951); Continental Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976); Western
World Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 481, 376 A.2d 177 (1977); Estate of
Penn, 148 N.J. Super. 419, 372 A.2d 1124 (1977). See also R. KEaON, BAsic TEXT ON
INSURANCE LAW § 7.8(d) (1971); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for
Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1136, 1152 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Keeton]; Lanzone, supra note 4, at 18, 24.
17. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 120 Ariz. 518, 433
P.2d 966 (1967); Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1349 (C.D. Cal. 1974);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 806, -,
373 A.2d 339, 340 (1977).
18. It is this writer's opinion that the subrogation doctrine has been so overused
and misapplied by the courts that it now, in many instances, works as a mere legal
fiction rather than an equitable principle. For a discussion of just a select few of the
problems involved with the application of the subrogation doctrine, see Barron,
"Heifetz" and the Collateral Source Rule, 48 Wis. B. BULL. 27 (1975); Term of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court - Insurance, 61 MARQ. L. REv. 326, 326-36 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Term of Court]. See also Rixmann v. Somerset Pub. Schools, 83
Wis. 2d 571, 266 N.W.2d 326 (1978).
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should best be considered to be negligence. Certainly, harm to
the excess carrier is foreseeable if the primary insurer fails to
reasonably settle a claim within policy limits. 9 To extend a
duty of due care to the primary insurer under such circumstances would do no violence to the law of negligence. Professor
Prosser once remarked, "the courts will find a duty where, in
general, reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it
exists. 2 0 Moreover, since most courts have recognized that an
insurer owes a duty to refrain from negligent conduct to its
insured,21 it is a simple matter to extend this duty to excess
carriers.2 2 The problem of culpable conduct on the part of both
carriers could easily be handled through application of principles of comparative negligence. Additionally, the comparative
negligence approach would seem to work more equitably than
that of subrogation, for while unclean hands or culpable conduct will generally prevent a subrogee from recovering,2 contributory negligence only serves to diminish the amount of the
claimant's recovery.
Whether a court recognizes direct liability based on negligence or instead follows the subrogation approach should have
little or no effect on claim settlement practices. As will be
demonstrated, application of the principle of equitable subrogation has little impact on the scope of a primary carrier's
duties in the handling and settling of claims.
As a general rule, an excess insurer has the same rights of
subrogation as does any other insurer.24 The majority of courts
which have considered this question have held that an excess
carrier may maintain an action against a primary insurer for
negligence or bad faith handling of a claim under the doctrine
of equitable subrogation.2 The excess carrier acquires its right
19. Holloway, supranote 13, at 941.
20. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 54, at 327 (4th ed. 1971).
21. See, e.g., Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investor Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474,
323 A.2d 495 (1974); Alt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340, 237 N.W.2d
706 (1976).
22. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862
(1976); Estate of Penn, 148 N.J. Super. 419, -, 372 A.2d 1124, 1127. See also Note,
25 Drake L. Rev. 923 (1976).
23. See Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Western States Mut. Ins. Co., 49 Ill.
App. 2d
59, 198 N.E.2d 723 (1964).
24. 16 G. COUCH, CYcLOPEDIA OF INsURANcE LAW § 62.53 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as COUCH].
25. See, e.g., Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 297 (9th Cir. 1977); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. All Am. Bus Lines, 179 F. 2d 7 (10th Cir. 1950), on appeal
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of action upon payment of the insured's loss, and its right is
not dependent on the inclusion of a subrogation provision in
the insurance contract. Equitable subrogation arises purely by
2
operation of law. 1
To recover under this theory, the excess insurer must prove
six essential elements: first, a loss is sustained by the insured
for which the primary carrier is responsible; second, the excess
carrier has compensated the insured for the loss; third, the
insured has an existing, assignable cause of action against the
primary insurer; fourth, the excess insurer has suffered damages as a result of the primary carrier's errors or omissions;
fifth, the excess carrier acted reasonably and was not a volunteer; and sixth, that justice requires that the loss be shifted
from the excess carrier to the party producing it.7
Some courts have taken the position that the excess carrier
obtains no rights by operation of law or equity, and that such
insurers may only be subrogated 21 to the rights of the insured,
if the insurance contract expressly provides." This trivial distinction has very little effect on excess carriers, since most
insurance policies written today contain some subrogation or
assignment clause."0 Once an insurer is found to have subrogated rights, the source of the rights becomes irrelevant. The
right to recover by subrogation, regardless of the specie, is de3
termined by identical standards'.
following second trial, 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 851 (1951);
Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Western World Ins.
Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 481, 376 A.2d 177 (1977); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 78 N.M. 359, 431 P.2d 737 (1967). See
also COUCH, supra note 24, at § 62.53; Bloom, supra note 3, at 236-37; Holloway, supra
note 13, at 943; Keeton, supra note 16, at 1152.
26. Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 543, 253 N.W.2d 512, 515 (1977);
Kimball & Davis, The Extension of InsuranceSubrogation,60 MicH. L. REV. 841 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Kimball & Davis]; Term of Court, supra note 18, at 329.
27. Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Patent
Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson Constr. Co., 256 Cal. App. 2d 506, 509, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 187, 190 (1967).
28. Conventional subrogation arises as a result of an agreement between the parties
that the insurer should be subrogated to the rights of the insured. See Kimball &
Davis, supra note 26; Term of Court, supra note 18, at 330.
29. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 806, -, 373 A.2d
339, 340 (1977); Lanzone, supra note 4, at 19-20.
30. See R. KEETON, BAsic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw § 3.10 (1971).
31. This is true in Wisconsin, Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 543,
253 N.W.2d 512, 515 (1977); American Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee, 51 Wis. 2d 346, 352-53,
187 N.W.2d 142, 145 (1971), as well as in most other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Maryland
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The real question to be resolved with respect to the subrogation issue is whether the excess insurer has the same rights and
obligations as the insured or is afforded only a lesser degree of
protection. The majority of courts have held that the excess
carrier, as subrogee, steps into the shoes of the insured thus
making the rights of the insured and the excess carrier, vis-avis the primary carrier, identical.32 A number of writers however, have disputed these holdings and have argued that the
rights of the excess carrier should not be equal in view of the
insurer's greater knowledge, experience and expertise.3
Subrogation, as an equitable doctrine, mandates that all
relevant facts must be considered before a court can make a
final determination. This principle opens the door for consideration of the excess carrier's ability to protect itself. In most
cases this ability is minimal, since the primary carrier generally has full control of the handling of the claim, or at least
through its initial stages. Excess insurers often find themselves
receiving late notice or even no notice of the existence of the
claim, thus making it impossible to take adequate protective
measures. 4 Though the excess insurer's experience and knowledge should be considered, it is apparent that this factor
cannot alone determine the outcome of the carrier's right to
recover.
As already indicated, whether a jurisdiction follows the
approach of equitable subrogation or recognizes a direct duty
in tort, the ultimate results should remain the same. In either
Cas. Co. v. Cincinnati, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 74 Ind. App. 272, 124 N.E. 744 (1919);
Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Hogges, 67 N.J. Super. 475, 171 A.2d 120 (1961); Lyons
v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971). Contra, Shifrin
v. McGuire & Hester Constr. Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 420, 48 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1966); Blue

Cross v. O'Donnel, 230 So. 2d 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Ervin v. Garner, 25 Ohio
St. 2d 231, 267 N.E.2d 769 (1971).
32. See, e.g., Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F. 2d 292, 297 (9th Cir. 1977); Vencill
v. Continental Cas. Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (S.D. W. Va. 1977); Peter v. Travelers

Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974); MAGrmcC, supra note 1, at 215;
Keeton, supra note 16, at 1152.
33. See Bloom, supra note 3, at 236-37; Holloway, supra note 13, at 944; Knepper,
supra note 12, at 210.
34. See, e.g., Smoral v. Hanover Ins. Co., 37 App. Div. 23, 322 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1971).
In Smoral the excess carrier received no notice of the claim until the primary had

reached a settlement agreement with the claimant whereby the primary carrier was
released from liability and given a credit for the amount of its policy limits, while the

claimant reserved his rights to proceed against the insured and the excess insurer for
the remainder of his claim. The excess carrier only learned of the claim when the

primary carrier turned the matter over to the excess carrier to maintain the defense.
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case, the primary insurer must afford the same protections to
the excess carrier as it affords to the insured. This is clearly the
trend in the development of the law on the subject,35 and its
development should be welcomed. There are strong public policy considerations which favor the extension of the protections
guaranteed to the insured to those guaranteed excess carriers.
Extension of the primary carrier's duty to include the excess
carrier reduces the insurer's temptation to speculate when
faced with claims in excess of its policy limits. Absent some
legal liability, the primary insurer may gamble with the excess
carrier's money and has little to lose by refusing to reasonably
settle.3 6 The extention of these protections also encourages primary carriers to remain alert to settlement possibilities - even
in instances where it is not clearly in their economic interest
to do so." Further, if primary carriers were relieved of their
duty to accept reasonable settlement offers in cases where
excess insurance coverage is available, extra and uncontemplated costs to excess insurers could result, thereby increasing
the price of such insurance without additional benefits or coverage. If excess carriers were not allowed to recover against
primary carriers for breach of their duty to settle, it would provide a disincentive for the primary carrier to settle a claim
any time the offer was near the limits of the primary policy.31
Furthermore, to preclude liability would undermine the interests of the public and the insured in obtaining prompt and just
40
settlement of claims.
Thus, while some courts may follow different approaches to
the question, it can be seen that a primary carrier owes essentially the same duties to an excess carrier as it owes to its
insured. As a result, primary insurers should observe the same
standards of conduct in handling claims against their insureds
whether or not there is excess insurance coverage available. For
35. See, e.g., Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977); Vencill v.
Continental Cas Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. W. Va. 1977); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve
Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 806, 373 A.2d 339 (1977); Western World Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 150 N.J. Super. 481, 376 A.2d 177 (1977).
36. Holloway, supra note 13, at 944-45; Lanzone, supra note 4, at 23.
37. Bloom, supra note 3, at 238.
38. Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1351. See also Valentine v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 298 (9th Cir. 1977); Continental Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co.,
307 Minn. 5, -,
238 N.W.2d 862, 865 (1976).
39. See cases cited note 38 supra.
40. See cases cited note 38 supra.
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all practical purposes then, an insurer who wishes to determine
its obligations to an excess carrier need only look to the duties
owed its insured and extend them accordingly. This is especially true since there is not a great deal of case law regarding
the specific duties owed to excess carriers.
The remainder of this article will now examine a number of
these specific duties and in particular consider the question of
the excess carrier's right to actively pursue settlement within
the limits of the primary policy.
III.

SPECIFIC DUTIES WHICH A PRIMARY INSURER OWES TO AN

EXCESS INSURER

A. Duty to Defend; Responsibility for Defense Costs.
As with many insurance issues, the contract language controls the duty to defend. The language of most primary policies
provides that the insurer reserves the exclusive right to control
selection and direction of the defense. Because of this contractual reservation, the primary duty to defend is on the primary
carrier." However, an excess insurer may also be obligated to
defend under its policy, and the duty is not necessarily extinguished by tendering the defense of an action to the underlying carrier. Since the duty to defend of each insurer is several
and not joint,42 there may be instances where the excess carrier is required to assist the primary carrier in the defense of
the claim. 3
Though a primary insurer's contractual duty to defend extends only to its insured," a primary carrier can nevertheless
be liable to an excess carrier if the former is negligent in the
performance of its obligations. 5 As a general rule, if a primary
insurer wrongfully refuses to defend, it will be liable to the
excess carrier for the costs of the defense and reasonable expenses. 6 The primary insurer will also be liable to the excess for
41. Bloom, supra note 3, at 236; Holloway, supra note 13, at 945.
42. Keeton, supra note 16, at 1152.
43. Lujan v. Gonzales, 89 N.M. 229, _,
501 P.2d 673, 677 (1972); MAGAMCK,
supra note 1, at 22.
44. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579, 581 (10th
Cir. 1960); Bloom, supra note 3, at 236.
45. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 806, _, 373 A.2d 339, 340
(1977); Bloom, supra note 3, at 237.
46. See generally Western Pac. Ins. Co. v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 69 Wash. 2d 11,
-,
416 P.2d 468, 472 (1966); MAGARICK, supra note 1, at 215; Bloom, supra note 3,
at 236.
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any amount paid by the excess insurer which is within the
primary policy limits. 7
Although the initial duty to defend falls upon the carrier
with primary coverage, the amount demanded may shift this
responsibility in some jurisdictions. Where an action has been
commenced and the ad damnum exceeds the primary policy
limits, courts have differed on the parties' respective responsibilities hor the defense of the action. While there is considerable
authority for the proposition that the primary insurer has the
principal obligation to defend,48 many decisions have recognized an equal or coexisting duty to defend on the part of the
excess insurer. 9 Where a coexistent duty to defend is recognized, the majority view holds that the excess carrier must
share in the costs of defense 0 Other decisions have held that
the duty of each insurer is personal and several, thus preventing the insurer providing the defense from seeking contribution.' At least one court has ruled that the excess carrier can
be obligated to defend where the primary carrier refuses to do
S0.52 Still another courthas held that the excess insurer has a
primary duty to defend anytime the ad damnum exceeds primary policy limits. 3 A major factor in this latter decision was
the fact that the primary carrier had already paid out its policy
limits. 54 Whether the excess insurer had a duty to assume the
defense absent an exhaustion of the underlying policy limits
was left unanswered.
From the foregoing review of the relevant case law, it is
47. Continental Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, -,
238 N.W.2d 862
INSURANCE LAW § 7.8(d) (1971).
48. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 73 N.J. Super. 407, 180 A.2d
168 (1962); MAGARCK, supra note 1, at 21.
49. See, e.g., American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania Threshermen &
Farmer's Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1960); St. Paul-Mercury Ins. Co.
v. Huitt, 215 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1963), affl'd, 336 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1964);
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 150 F. Supp. 216 (D. Ark.

(1976); R. KEETON, BASic TEXT ON

1957);

MAGAXCK,

supra note 1, at 21.

50. See, e.g., St. Paul-Mercury Ins. Co. v. Huitt, 215 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich.
1963), affl'd, 336 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1964); MAGAMCK, supra note 1, at 21-22.
51. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579 (10th
Cir. 1960); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmer's
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1960); Maryland Cas. Co. v. American
Fidelity Ins. Group, 199 Kan. 373, 429 P.2d 931 (1967).
52. Continental Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 275 F.2d 381 (7th Cir.
1960).

53. Benroth v. Continental Cas. Co., 132 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. La. 1955).
54. Id. at 274.
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apparent that there is a wide range of opinion as to which
insurer is responsible for the conduct and costs of the defense
in cases where the ad damnum exceeds the primary limits. The
divergent opinions cannot coherently be reconciled. This suggests that the ad damnum cannot provide an appropriate
basis for resolving this issue. Moreover, there are several other
reasons why this clause is ill-suited for this purpose.
It is a fact of modem reality that the ad damnum clause
bears little relation to the amount of the claimant's damages
or ultimate recovery. Since the amount demanded in the complaint is not an accurate indicator of the value of the claim, its
use as the determinative factor in deciding the responsibility
for the control .and cost of the defense should be strictly limited. In this writer's opinion, the settlement value of the claim
is a more reliable and realistic standard for allocating the responsibility to defend. If the plaintiff's lowest settlement demand is below the primary policy limits, the primary insurer
should be obligated to continue and complete the defense of the
suit. On the other hand if the claimant's final demand exceeds
the primary limits, it is more likely that the loss will ultimately
fall on the excess carrier, and therefore, the excess carrier
should be obligated to assume the defense. The excess carrier's
duty should be contingent, however, on the continued cooperation of the underlying insurer. As a minimum, the primary
carrier should make its file available to the excess insurer and
render any necessary assistance.
B. Duty to Appeal
The standard liability insurance, policy does not contain
any provisions obligating an insurer to appeal an adverse verdict.5 Moreover, several older decisions have held thatthere is
no extracontractual duty to appeal an adverse verdict which is
within the insurer's policy limits. 6 The general rule today regarding verdicts in excess of policy limits is that the duty to
defend includes the duty to appeal where there are reasonable
grounds on which an appeal could be based. 57 This rule should
55. MAGA UCK, supra note 1, at 175.
56. Ginder v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 49 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1942), affl'd,
135 F.2d 215 (3rd Cir. 1942); Lincoln Park Arms Bldg. Corp. v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 181 I1. 512, 5 N.E.2d 773 (1936).
57. See Reichert v. Continental Ins. Co., 290 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 1974); Fidelity
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 27 App. Div. 2d 932, 278 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1967);
MAGARICK, supra note 1, at 175-76.
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equally apply when there is an excess carrier involved.
Whether the presence of excess insurance affects the primary insurer's duty to appeal is unsettled. The view most consistent with other obligations of the primary insurer is that the
primary carrier owes the same duty to appeal to an excess
carrier as is owed to the insured." Despite this rule one federal
circuit court has held that upon a primary insurer's payment
of its policy limits into court there is no further responsibility
to make an appeal or to pay for appeal costs. 9 This is true
notwithstanding the presence of reasonable grounds to appeal.
These seemingly contradictory rulings can easily be reconciled. If the primary insurer is not guilty of bad faith in failing
to settle, it should be allowed to buy its peace by tendering its
limits into court. The excess insurer, having the most at stake,
would then be free to appeal or pay the judgment as it sees fit.
This view is consistent with the recommended industry settlement principles for primary and excess insurers.'
C. Duty to Communicate With the Excess Carrier
Although there is very little law on the issue of notice, common sense would dictate that the primary. insurer contact and
communicate with an excess carrier when the latter's interests
could be affected by a claim. Contrary to this practical approach, a New York court in Smoral v. HanoverInsurance Co. '
held that a primary carrier has no duty to give an excess insurer
notice of the progress of the claim or of a settlement reached
between the primary carrier and the third party claimant. This
rule was applicable, said the court, even though the settling
party reserved the right to proceed against the excess carrier for
any amount in excess of the primary limits.2 The dissent in
Smoral argued that the primary carrier should have a duty to
inform the excess insurer of the status of the claim, and moreover, even if this were not a legal obligation, common courtesy
58. See Lanzone, supra note 4, at 22. See also Home Ins. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co.,
68 Misc. 2d 737, 327 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1972), aff'd without opinion, 332 N.Y.S.2d 1003
(1972).
59. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 361
(10th Cir. 1958). See also MAGAmCK, supra note 1, at 22, 217-18.
60. The text of these principles is set out in full in MAGARCK, supra note 1, at 21618.
61. 37 App. Div. 23, 322 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1971).
62. Id. at 25, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
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would require that the excess carrier be given notice.13
The recommended industry claim settlement procedures
outline a standard of conduct which requires primary insurers
to diligently investigate and evaluate all claims without regard
to whether the primary limits will be consumed.64 All relevant
information is to be freely transferred to the excess insurer and
an atmosphere of cooperation is to be encouraged. Since most
courts extend the same protections to excess carriers as are
afforded insureds, a primary insurer would be well' advised to
follow the industry claim settlement procedures, rather than
relying on the aberrant holding of Smoral.
D. Duty to Cooperate
Once again, although there is no definitive case law regarding this particular duty, recommended claims handling procedures dictate that primary carriers cooperate fully and freely
with any excess carriers involved in a claim.6 5 The duty of
cooperation appears to be a mutual one and equally applicable
to either a primary or excess carrier. For example, if one company offers its proportional share to a reasonable settlement,
and the other insurer unreasonably blocks the settlement and
refuses to provide funds, the latter insurer has violated its duty
to the insured and the other carrier and is liable for any amount
which exceeds the settlement figure.66 Recognition of this duty
works no hardship on the insurer and promotes the policy goal
of fair and expedient settling of insurance claims.
E. Duty to Settle
As a general rule, a primary carrier owes a duty to the
insured, to exercise good faith in determining whether a settlement offer should be accepted or rejected." This duty extends,
at least indirectly, to excess insurers who also provide coverage.
Under the rule of equitable subrogation, a primary insurer
is required to give adequuate consideration to the interests of
the excess carrier, as the excess insurer's rights are derived
from those of the insured. 8 Where a direct duty is recognized,
63. Id. at 27, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
64. MAGARICK, supra note 1, at 216-17.
65.. Id.
66. Keeton,supra note 16, at 1152.
67. See, e.g., St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951);
Alt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340, 237 N.W.2d 706 (1976).
68. Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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the primary insurer has a direct obligation to consider the interests of the excess carrier and to act in good faith in the
settlement of the claim. 9 In any event, it is generally recognized that an excess carrier can recover from a primary carrier
7
0
any excess of loss caused by the negligence or bad faith ' of
72
the primary carrier in settling a claim.
IV.

THE EXCESS CARRIER'S RIGHT TO ACTIVELY PURSUE

SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE PRIMARY CARRIER'S POLICY LIMITS

As already noted, the primary carrier has the initial obligation and right to direct and control the defense of the suit.
Because of this duty, the primary insurer also has the right of
full control over the handling and settlement of claims made
within its policy limits. 73 For example, if an action is started
and the ad damnum clause of the complaint demands an
amount less than the primary policy limits, the primary carrier
has the exclusive right and duty to defend the action. 71 Only
where the primary carrier refuses to provide a defense can the
excess carrier take over the control and handling of the claim.
Because settlements are part and parcel of defending a
claim, it seems logical that the right to control the settlement
should track the insurer's duty to defend. Thus, where an excess carrier has a duty to defend,75 it follows that it should also
have the right to control the settlement negotiations.
Since the excess carrier will generally only be required to
defend claims where the primary carrier refuses to defend, 71 or
the claim value greatly exceeds the primary policy limits, 77
69. Vencill v. Continental Cas. Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (S.D. W. Va. 1977);
MAGARUCK, supra note 1, at 215.
70. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 806, -, 373 A.2d
339, 340 (1977).
71. See, e.g., American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. All Am. Bus Lines, 179 F.2d 7 (10th
Cir. 1949), on appealfollowing second trial, 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 851 (1951).
72. See generally Bloom, supra note 3, at 237.
73. Brockstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1969); Lanzone,
supra note 4, at 18.
74. See, e.g., Priester v. Viligant Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 156 (S.D. Iowa 1967);
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 239 So. 2d 472 (La. App.
1970); MAGARICK, supra note 1, at 21.
75. See text accompanying notes 41-54 supra.
76. See Continental Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 275 F.2d 381 (7th
Cir. 1960).
77. See Benroth v. Continental Cas. Co., 132 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. La. 1955).

1979]

EXCESS INSURANCE

excess carriers will seldom be in a position of prejudicing the
primary carrier's rights by unreasonably agreeing to settle for
amounts within the limits of the primary coverage. Where the
excess carrier is handling the claim because of the primary
insurer's wrongful refusal, the primary carrier's misconduct
should prevent any claim of bad faith occasioned by the excess
insurer's action of settling the claim within primary policy limits. Where the excess carrier is defending a claim because the
amount demanded is greater than the primary coverage, this
situation is somewhat more delicate. Nevertheless, the excess
insurer should have the right, to seek a settlement for an
amount within the primary limits, provided it receives the consent of the primary carrier. Such consent should not unreason8
ably be withheld.1
In cases of questionable liability or exaggerated damages,
an exccess carrier cannot force a primary carrier to accept a
settlement offer which the insurer would not otherwise be required to accept under its duties to the insured." This rule is
necessary to preserve the primary carrier's right to protect itself
from ill-advised settlements and unwarranted losses. Should
the primary carrier's intransigence be unreasonable, the excess
carrier is adequately protected by the remedies available to it
80
under the doctrines of bad faith refusal to settle.
There may be several tactical advantages for defendants if
the excess carrier absents itself from participating in the handling of the claim. If during negotiations the claimant is unaware of the existence of the excess coverage a smaller settlement may be attainable. Just as too many cooks can spoil the
soup, so too can too many participants spoil a compromise of
a claim. If the primary insurer exercises good faith and due care
in the handling of a claim and adequately cooperates and communicates with the excess insurer, the excess insurer has no'
need to actively seek a settlement within the primary policy
limits.
78. Cf. MAGARICK, supra note 1, at 215.
79. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455, 457, (10th Cir. 1951);

Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Bloom, supra
note 3, at 237.
80. Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350-51, (C.D. Cal. 1974); All-

state Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 806, _,

373 A.2d 339, 340 (1977).
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CONCLUSION

The law on many aspects of the relationship between primary and excess insurers is both scarce and incomplete. Nevertheless, it is clear that a primary insurer must exercise good
faith and due care at all stages in the claims handling process.
Primary insurers who breach these duties of good faith and due
care expose themselves to liability for any damages caused to
excess insurers.
In this area, practical considerations are often paramount
to legal theories and technical rules. While the law has not
adequately developed to the stage where all the intricacies of
the relationship between primary and excess carriers are perfectly defined, common sense, available precedent and industry standards provide a more than adequate guide for insurers.
In one sense, perhaps, it would be best if the law never developed beyond this stage. Case law could not develop if the standards of good faith and fair dealing were scrupulously observed
by all concerned. Where differences of opinion arise, these internecine disputes can be resolved through arbitration where
arbitrators, because of their specialized experience, could better handle these practical problems. Be that as it may, a primary insurer must keep uppermost in its mind the fact that an
insurer who subordinates the interest of its insured or the insured's excess insurer to its own, does so at its peril and should
be prepared to pay for its folly.

